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*English text*

*for Nov-Dec 75*

*European trip*

**OSD REVIEW COMPLETED**

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24 SEP 1975

DDCI BRIEFING

STRATEGIC FORCES

- I. The Soviets are moving ahead with a new program for their strategic offensive forces. This program, which is substantially altering the composition of the force, includes both a new generation of ICBMs and improved silos prepared for them.

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A.

Since

the signing of the SALT agreements, the Soviets have not increased the number of ICBM launchers but, for the most part, are modifying silos originally constructed for older ICBMs.

1. Almost 1,400 ICBMs are now operational. About 200 silos are out of service while they are being modified. These numbers will fluctuate slightly as the modification program proceeds. The Soviets should complete the program by the early 1980s.

2. Before the silo program started, about 300 silos held the large SS-9 and almost 1,000 were for

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the smaller SS-11. Other launchers were for  
the solid-propellant SS-13 and the older SS-7  
and SS-8 ICBMs.

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V. In addition, a silo modernization program is under way.

At six SS-11 complexes, 420 silos are being readied for later variants of the SS-11--the Mod 2 and the Mod 3.

- A. The SS-11 Mod 2 carries one warhead and possibly some penetration aids and the Mod 3 carries three warheads that are not independently targetable.
- B. The modernization program should be completed by the end of this year.

VI. While the Soviets have moved ahead with the new silo programs, they have also begun to deactivate sites for older ICBMs.

- A. In 1973, evidence of a reduced readiness status was noted at 17 of the 62 SS-7 above ground launch sites. We believe that the sites are no longer operational.

The Soviets are

working on three more.

- B. As the older launchers are dismantled, the Soviets--under SALT--can replace them with launchers on ballistic missile submarines.

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Strategic Naval Programs

- VII. The Soviets are continuing to build ballistic missile submarines. After producing 34 Y-class submarines, they have turned their efforts toward construction of D-class ballistic missile submarines. The D-class is a larger nuclear boat that carries longer range missiles.
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- [Redacted]

B. Eleven D-class submarines are now considered operational and some of these have already been on patrol in the Barents Sea.

- VIII. The D-class submarines carry 12 SS-N-8 missiles.

A. This missile has an operational range of 4,200 miles (7,800 kilometers)--about three times the range of the one carried in the Y-class

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[Redacted] This missile could reach targets in much of the US even if it were fired from or near home ports in the USSR.

B. The Soviets have also launched two boats that are a "stretched" version of their D-class submarine.

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They are some 50 feet (15 meters) longer than the standard D-class and will each carry 16 missiles.

1. This will permit them to move closer to the missile limit of 950 launchers allowed under the terms of the SALT agreement without exceeding the count of 62 submarines.
- C. The Soviets are also working on new SLBMs to replace the SS-N-6 and SS-N-8.

Strategic Bombers

- IX. There has been no appreciable change in the capabilities of Soviet Long Range Strategic Aviation over the past few years.

- A. The Soviets have a force of 140 heavy bombers and 55 tankers and reconnaissance aircraft whose primary mission is intercontinental operations. They also have about 650 medium bombers for use mainly against Europe and Asia.


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Antiballistic Missiles

- X. Turning now from strategic offense to strategic defense, there have been, in recent years, fewer developments in this field than in offensive missiles or submarines.
- A. The Russians still have a total of 64 ABM launchers at four complexes around Moscow, and there is no evidence of any effort to deploy ABMs elsewhere.

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A launch site

includes eight Galosh ABM launchers, one large target acquisition and tracking radar and two smaller defensive missile tracking radars which guide the ABM interceptor to its target. These radars are known collectively as the Try Adds.

- B. To provide early warning of approaching missiles, the Soviets have large radars which we call Hen Houses operating at five sites on the periphery of the USSR--at Mishelevka, at Sary Shagan, at Skrunda, at Olenegorsk, and at Sevastopol

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A new Hen House radar is currently under construction at Mukachevo in the western USSR.

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1. The Soviets are also constructing another large early warning radar at Olenegorsk which will provide more precise long-range tracking of ICBMs launched from the US.
- C. In addition to covering US ICBM and submarine missile launches, the Hen House radars are situated to provide warning of strategic missiles launched by other countries--principally France, the United Kingdom, and China.
  1. Two of these radars--at Skrunda and Sevastopol--cover areas from which French sea- and land-based strategic missiles might be launched. The Hen House at Olenegorsk also has some capability of detecting French missile launches.
- D. We do not consider the Moscow ABM system to be very advanced.
  1. The large Try Add radar at each site has a dish type antenna capable of handling at most only a few closely spaced targets at a time.
  2. In the event of a heavy attack, the Soviet system would quickly be exhausted. Reloading the launchers would require a minimum of 20

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minutes, and there are presently no storage facilities for reload missiles at the launch complexes.

3. Another shortcoming of the system is the ABM interceptor which we call Galosh. The Galosh has been tested against simulated and real targets both within and outside the earth's atmosphere.

The Galosh ABM

accelerates slowly, however, This means that for intercepts within the atmosphere, the Galosh would have to be launched while the target is a considerable distance away and before the atmosphere has stripped away decoys and chaff.

4. The Soviets do not have a fast reaction interceptor

They may, however,

have a program under way to develop such a system.

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DDCI BRIEFING

24 SEP 1975

SOVIET NAVAL OPERATIONS

- I. I would like to spend a few minutes talking about Soviet naval activities. The Soviet Navy has evolved from a coastal defense force to a navy capable of operating in the world's oceans. This capability was amply demonstrated in April of this year when the Soviets conducted a large-scale naval exercise named Okean '75. This exercise tested their ability to conduct multi-purpose operations in ocean theaters of operations.
  - A. As in a similar exercise in 1970, ships, submarines and aircraft of the four fleets conducted coordinated operations controlled by the main naval staff in Moscow.
  - B. Over 200 surface warships, submarines, and support vessels took part in Okean '75 operations. Most of the exercise activity occurred in the Atlantic and Pacific but the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean were also involved.
- II. The exercise featured a high level of naval air activity and reconnaissance and progressed through antisubmarine and anticarrier phases.

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III. Since the mid-1960s, the deployed presence of Soviet naval forces abroad has added a new dimension to the political activity and economic military aid which had been the only visible instruments of Soviet influence in the Third World.

A. As the Soviet naval presence has expanded, the Soviets have obtained from some countries access to a few port facilities, limited over-flight and staging rights, and other privileges useful for maintenance and improvement of operational forces far from the USSR.

IV. The most visible military presence the Soviet Navy maintains abroad is the Mediterranean Squadron. It is the largest group of Soviet naval ships deployed away from home waters.

A. The primary mission of the Squadron is to provide a strategic defense of the Soviet Union by countering the US Sixth Fleet carrier task forces.

B. To accomplish these goals the Soviets maintain an average--including surface combatants, submarines, and auxiliaries--of 50 to 55 units in the Mediterranean.

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C. In October 1973, during the Arab-Israeli war, there were as many as 98 Soviet ships and submarines in the Mediterranean--an all-time high--but the force soon returned to a normal level.

V. The Soviets also maintain a naval presence in the Indian Ocean and West African waters, and periodically in the Caribbean. Thus far, these have reflected largely political rather than military concerns. The ships normally deployed to these areas make many port calls, but do not otherwise operate to a great extent.

A. In the Indian Ocean, the Soviets normally maintain three or four combatants, 10 to 15 other surface ships and auxiliaries, and one diesel-powered submarine.

B. Off West Africa, one or two Soviet naval ships normally patrol near Conakry, Guinea. Other Soviet ships occasionally replenish near Guinéa en route to the Indian Ocean.

C. The Soviet presence in the Caribbean has consisted of semiannual visits by two warships and sometimes a submarine for several weeks at a time. Since 1970 TU-95 naval reconnaissance aircraft have

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periodically deployed in pairs to Cuba and,  
since 1973, to Guinea.

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VI. In Somalia, the Soviets continue to expand their  
naval presence. [redacted] we are  
convinced that one of the installations being built  
at Berbera is a Soviet naval cruise-missile support  
facility.

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C. Apart from the cruise missile question, the  
Soviets have steadily increased their use of  
Berbera since their first naval visit in February  
1969.

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1. A Soviet barracks-and-repair barge has been stationed there since October 1972.

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2. A Soviet communications facility became operational in December 1972.
3. The Soviet housing compound has been expanded since January 1973 and could accommodate some 1,200 people.
4. Since February 1974 the Soviets have expanded the capacity of Berbera's POL installation from about 60,000 to 190,000 barrels.
5. A few days after the Soviet-Somali Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was ratified last October, Soviet naval transport aircraft began monthly flights to Hargeisa Airfield, some 100 miles to the south, the nearest large airport to Berbera. The Soviets also began construction of a major airfield at Berbera itself.

VII. The Soviet Navy also has a role to play in concert with other strategic forces.

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A. Four Y-class submarines are normally maintained on station--two in the Atlantic and two in the Pacific.

1. These submarines are equipped with 16 SS-N-6 missiles which have a range of 1,300 miles.

B. The Soviets have now established a permanent patrol of at least one D-class submarine in the Barents or Greenland Seas. The first operational patrol in the Pacific is expected shortly.

1. As increasing numbers of D-class submarines become available, their 4,200 mile range SS-N-8s will give the Soviets the alternatives of operating them close to their bases under the protective cover of air and surface forces, or deploying them in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic Oceans.

VIII. Closer to home, Soviet naval activities reflect traditional Soviet concern for guarding the sea frontiers of the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies.

A. Of the four Soviet fleets, the Pacific and the Northern are the best equipped.

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1. They have all the ballistic missile submarines intended for strategic attack against North America and the Eurasian continent.
  2. They also contain most of the aircraft and all the nuclear submarines that would be most effective in ASW operations.
- B. The Black and Baltic Fleets, as you are aware, have the primary mission of securing control of these seas and denying them to hostile naval forces.

- [Redacted]
2. Recent Warsaw Pact naval maneuvers in the Baltic enabled the East German, Polish, and Soviet navies to exercise their intended wartime roles. Similar exercises are periodically held in the Black Sea.

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FORCES FOR PERIPHERAL ATTACK

I have addressed advances in the Soviet strategic forces designed for intercontinental operations.

These forces are of interest primarily to us. I would now turn your attention to a force that strikes closer to home--if you will excuse the pun. The Soviets maintain an appreciable force reserved for operations on the periphery of the Soviet Union, especially western Europe and China. This force includes a sizeable number of medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles and medium bombers, and even a few ICEMs.

- I. Most of the missiles, SS-4 MRBMs and SS-5 IRBMs are older systems fielded in the early to mid-1960s. The SS-4 has a range of about 1,000 miles (1,850 kilometers)

The

SS-5 has a range of about 2,200 miles (4,100 kilometers)

- A. These missiles are emplaced at both aboveground launch sites and in silos

1. Currently there are 583 operational launchers for these missiles and nearly all are targeted

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against western Europe.

- B. At one time, the Soviets had nearly 700 MRBM and IRBM launchers located along the periphery of the USSR.
1. In late 1967, however, they began deactivating some of the launch sites.
  2. By the middle of 1972, 94 launchers had been deactivated, including all those located along the Sino-Soviet border in the far east.
  3. Since then there have been no further deactivations of MRBM or IRBM launch sites.
- C. Recently, the Soviets have been upgrading the remaining sites.
1. They have installed improved communication equipment and have constructed revetments around the launch areas.
  2. The revetments provide some protection against attack by conventional weapons although little protection against nuclear attack.
- D. At about the same time the MRBM and IRBM launch sites were deactivated, the Soviets fielded about 190 SS-11 ICBMs at launch sites oriented to allow full coverage of China and the Far East as well as the United States.

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1. Other SS-11 sites were oriented so as to provide better capability against western Europe and the Middle East.
  2. While these SS-11s will be replaced as newer generation missiles are introduced, there is reason to believe that some ICBMs will continue to be targeted against peripheral regions.
- II. The Soviets also have a force of about 650 medium bombers most of which are based at airfields in the western USSR.
- A. The bombers are older aircraft and include the subsonic Badger and supersonic Blinder.
- III. The peripheral forces are also receiving a new generation of weapons.
- A. In September 1974, the Soviets conducted the first flight test of a new IRBM--the SS-X-20.

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2. Last month, the Soviets conducted the first long range flight test of the missile by firing it some 2,200 miles (4,100 kilometers).

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4. We expect that the SS-X-20 will eventually replace the SS-4s and the SS-5s.

B. The Backfire, a new intermediate-range bomber, is also starting to reach the forces in numbers. It is being delivered to operational Long Range Aviation units as well as to Soviet naval aviation.

1. The Backfire is a swing-wing medium bomber with speed in excess of Mach 2 and a combat radius of up to 2,900 nautical miles (5,400 kilometers) under ideal flight conditions. It is best suited for operations against targets in Europe and Asia.

2. Two air-to-surface missiles have recently been identified with the Backfire. One probably is an improved version of a missile already in the Soviet inventory,

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3. As the Backfire is phased into the force, the number of medium bombers in Soviet Long Range Aviation should begin to decline. The Backfire

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probably will not replace the older bombers on  
a one-for-one basis.

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24 SEP 1975

NATO-WARSAW PACT BALANCE

I. When we undertake a comparison of the military forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, we are immediately struck by the asymmetries that characterize the two sides. By most quantitative yardsticks, the Pact enjoys a numerical advantage. NATO's forces, on the other hand, have been generally recognized as having a qualitative edge. When the two forces are examined with these considerations in mind, it can fairly be said that there is a rough balance between the two. That is, neither side enjoys the sort of superiority that would ensure success if it were to go to war with the other.

A. The differences between the two sides stem primarily from the perceptions each has of the capabilities of its potential adversary and of the nature of the conflict that is envisaged.

1. When compared with NATO, the Pact has equipped itself with a large number of combat maneuver units and tanks and artillery, and with heavy battlefield air defenses.
2. The Soviet military evidently believes that Pact ground forces are superior to NATO's.

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Soviet concepts for use of these forces envisage intensive operations meant to overrun the FRG and the Benelux countries in a few short weeks. This rapidly advancing offensive would depend heavily on the tank--Pact forces in Central Europe have some 16,000.

3. The Pact force structure and size is a tacit recognition of the advantages NATO enjoys in high quality, multi-purpose aircraft, in antitank defenses and in tactical nuclear weapons.
4. The rapidity with which the Pact would hope to complete its offensive reflects Soviet appreciation of the FRG's capability to expand rapidly and significantly the size of its armed forces directly opposite the Pact in Central Europe. The Pact's emphasis on blitzkrieg type operations also reflects an appreciation of NATO's capacity in general to bring superior resources to bear over the long term.

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5. The objectives of a Pact ground offensive would be to achieve a rapid breakthrough of NATO's forward defenses before they could be fully developed and to penetrate deep into NATO territory in order to disrupt NATO mobilization, isolate major NATO force elements, and prevent reinforcement from the US.
6. Meanwhile, in the air, Pact air forces would be flying strikes that would be designed primarily to destroy or limit NATO's ability to escalate to nuclear war.

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- [Redacted]
- B. Let's take a brief look now at how NATO and the Pact stack up in the central region or what we call the NATO Guidelines Area (NGA).

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- [Redacted]
2. Take manpower, for example. There are about 950,000 Pact ground forces troops in the NGA. Of these about 475,000 are Soviet. The remaining 475,000 are East European. A key question with respect to these latter,

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and one that is certainly in the minds of the Soviets, would be their reliability in a confrontation with NATO in which their national interests were not directly at stake. Soviet leaders have committed themselves to relying on East European forces to carry out wartime functions critical to the Pact's prospects for success.

3. By comparison, NATO has about 790,000 men on active duty in the NGA. Of these some 190,000 are US troops.

- C. The numbers of ground force divisions each side has varied considerably because of different approaches to force structure and employment doctrine.

1. On the Pact side there are 58 tank and motorized rifle divisions in the NGA. Of these 27 are Soviet and these are manned at or near full strength. The remaining 31 are East European and most of these would have to be filled out with varying numbers of reservists before use in combat. They probably would be less effective than their Soviet counterparts because of

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differences in manning and equipment.

One reason the Pact maintains a large number of divisions is because it intends to commit such units in successive waves to replace losses by substituting whole units.

2. NATO has 25 divisions in the NGA. Many of these divisions are larger than those of the Pact by about 6,000 to 7,000 men each and generally would require less mobilization than the Eastern European divisions. Also, unlike the Pact, NATO forces are structured to replace manpower and equipment losses in the divisions as they occur. Pact plans call for the replacement of entire divisions as they sustain high losses.
- D. The one category in which the Pact clearly outweighs NATO is tanks. When looking at this disparity, however, one should keep in mind the large numbers of NATO defensive systems that Pact tanks would be confronting. In addition to NATO's own tanks, these would include about

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2,000 heavy ground-based antitank weapons, NATO's tactical air forces, and a growing family of sophisticated precision guided munitions. Furthermore, if nuclear weapons were used, the Soviets expect they would suffer large tank losses to NATO's numerous tactical nuclear delivery systems.

- E. There is still another area where a simple count tends to obscure one of NATO's most important strengths--its tactical aircraft.
  - 1. Although Pact aircraft outnumber those of NATO, NATO's aircraft are generally superior in range, payload, and armament, and its pilots are better trained.
  - 2. The Soviets are well into an extensive reequipment program designed to improve both the defensive and offensive quality of Pact tactical air forces. The new tactical aircraft coming into the forward area include newer designs specifically for ground-attack and, multi-purpose swing-wing aircraft.
  - 3. These newer aircraft give the Pact some improvement in range and weapons load, and the capability of conducting strikes throughout

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West Germany and, to a lesser degree, in the Benelux countries. Pending the completion of the Soviet reequipment program and the upgrading of East European air forces, however, the Pact will be forced to rely on older, medium bombers for large scale air strikes against targets deep in NATO territory. Such bombers are, of course, more vulnerable to NATO air defenses.

4. Despite their force improvement program, the Pact still is inferior to NATO forces in advanced multi-role combat aircraft capable of operating in a modern combat environment.

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DDCI BRIEFING

SINO SOVIET BORDER

I.


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II. The Soviet buildup along the Chinese border has slowed considerably since the late Sixties, and the

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Soviets appear to have nearly reached their force goals for the area.

A. There are about 37 active divisions in the immediate border area, compared with 13 in 1964.

1. In addition, there are five divisions located in the Siberian Military District. These divisions are located far from convenient land approaches to China but they could be used as reinforcements to bring the total number of available divisions to about 42.

B. For air support, they could call on some 1,200 tactical combat aircraft stationed in the border area. The Soviets are upgrading their tactical air capability by assigning new sophisticated fighter-bombers to bases near the border.

C. The ground forces in the border area now number about 365,000 men.

1. Slightly more than one-half of the divisions along the border are understrength, and would require the mobilization of

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reservists and vehicles from the civilian economy before being committed to combat.

2. Mobilized and brought to full strength, the border force would number nearly 700,000 men.
  3. With reinforcements from other military districts in the eastern USSR, the Soviets could have almost one million men available for operations against China.
- D. Since the Soviet buildup on the Chinese border reached a peak in the late Sixties, the Russians have concentrated on improving and fleshing out the basic force, adding about one new division a year on the average.
- E. As the rate at which the Soviets have added new divisions has slowed, they have increasingly turned their efforts to developing support units at the army and front level.
1. These support units had been missing from the force during the earlier years of the buildup as the Soviets had first concentrated on establishing the combat elements of the force.

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2. Through their current efforts they are creating a balanced force with support commensurate to the number of divisions.

F. The Soviet forces now in place could defend against any force the Chinese would be likely to send against the USSR in the next several years.

1. As they now stand, however, they would need substantial reinforcement before engaging in protracted offensive operations deep into China.

III. On the Chinese side, Peking has only gradually expanded the forces in its four northern military regions since the rapid build-up following the border clash in 1969.

A. The force in these four northern military regions numbers about 1.6 million combat and support troops, over 45 percent of China's 3.5 million troops.

1. Most of the Chinese troops are deployed well back from the border. This contrasts with the Soviets, whose forward deployment reflects a

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clear military superiority and a commitment to the vital Trans-Siberian Railway supply line which parallels the China border.

2. In contrast to the heavily mechanized Soviet forces with their modern equipment, the Chinese are deficient in armor and artillery, and their weaponry is of 1950s design. In tanks alone, the Chinese have fewer than 4,000 in the border regions against more than 10,000 on the Soviet side.
- B. The Chinese have made use of favorable terrain features to build a series of fortified areas along the major approaches from the Soviet and Mongolian borders.
  1. This suggests that the Chinese intend to conduct a determined defense in these areas.
- C. The Chinese also have some 2,000 aircraft in the northern military regions, about 40% of their total force. Most of the aircraft have an air defense role and are deployed in eastern China to protect important population and industrial centers.
- D. At present, Chinese troops outnumber the Soviets in the border area by more than three to one.

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Nonetheless, the Soviets would have a substantial advantage in any operations other than a deep penetration of China because of their superiority in air power and in ground force weapons.

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September 24, 1975

CHINESE STRATEGIC WEAPONS

I. A major change in the Sino-Soviet military equation is China's growing nuclear capability. Today China can deliver nuclear weapons on targets around its periphery by both missile and bomber.

A. We have identified some 60 units or launch sites--complete or under construction--for strategic missiles. These missiles are of two types:

1. The 600 mile--or medium range--missile we call the CSS-1.

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2. The 1,500 nautical mile--or intermediate range--missile we call the CSS-2. From sites presently operational, this system

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could strike targets in most of the eastern  
USSR, much of India, and Southeast Asia  
as far south as Singapore.

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B. Because none of the shorter-range missiles  
are deployed in silos, the Chinese have  
attempted to protect them against a preemptive  
attack by making the sites difficult to find,

[redacted] 25X1

C. In addition to these systems, the Chinese are  
working on two longer range land-based missiles.

[redacted] 25X1

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25X1

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1. One of these, the CSS-X-3, a 3,200 nautical mile ICBM based on the CSS-2, may now be operational.

25X1

- D. Finally, the Chinese are developing a large ICBM, the CSS-X-4, which will be able to reach Western Europe and all of the United States.

25X1

25X1

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25X1

F. In addition to their nuclear missile force, the Chinese have some 60 TU-16 medium bombers, which can carry [redacted] to a radius of about 1,650 nautical miles.

25X1

1. [redacted]

25X1

2. Because the TU-16 force is deployed at only a half-dozen airfields, it is highly vulnerable to a preemtive nuclear strike. However, about 50 airfields throughout China are suitable for use by TU-16s and the bombers could be widely dispersed if Peking feared that an attack was imminent.



25X1

[Redacted]

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3. The Chinese also have 400 IL-28 jet light bombers. IL-28s were used as the delivery aircraft in the last two nuclear tests and the Chinese may plan to give a nuclear role to some of these aircraft--which have an operational radius of about 550 nautical miles.

[Redacted]

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